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Saturday 10 December 1977 CG NIDC 77/286C



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

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USSR - MIDDLE EAST: Criticism

The USSR has apparently decided at least for now to soft-pedal its criticism of Egyptian President Sadat The timing of this tactical shift suggests that the sudden closure of the Soviet consulates and cultural offices in Egypt convinced Moscow to moderate its public positions. The shift follows discussions between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Undersected Tetary Habib in Moscow last Sunday and Monday.
//On Thursday, the Soviet Ambassador to Damascus told his East European counterparts that Moscow has pressed the Syrians to reduce their attacks on Sadat and to avoid lining up with the Arab rejectionists. The Ambassador also asserted that, in their discussions with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in Moscow last week, the Soviets had strongly urged Syria to try to avoid a break in diplomatic relations with Egypt.//
Moscow's public reaction to the closing of its offices in Egypt also suggests that it has decided to adopt a more moderate line. Soviet commentary regarding Sadat has suddenly become particularly restrained and there has been no authoritative discussion of the closings. Even the discussion of Secretary Vance's trip to the Middle East has conveyed a tone of skepticism rather than criticism.

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JORDAN: Husayn and the West Bank King Husayn has indicated in recent interviews that Jordan would assume an active role in West Bank negotiations only if Israel is prepared to offer him substantial territorial concessions. Husayn's remarks are probably designed to impress on Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat that he must have firm indications of Israeli willingness to pull back from most of the West Bank before he will take the substantial risks involved in participating in the Cairo conference or a truncated Geneva Conference.
In a Newsweek interview published earlier this week, Husayn offered the clearest public indication to date that he might, if the conditions are right, ignore the 1974 Rabat Summit declarations making the Palestine Liberation Organization the sole negotiator for the Palestinians. However, Husayn's conditions—Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem and a pullback to the June 1967 borders in exchange for "total peace"—are unlikely to appeal to the Israelis, who would hardly view such preconditions as "negotiating." Husayn has admitted that he sees no sign Israel is ready to meet his conditions.
Husayn clearly wanted to discourage the Israelis from believing he could be enticed into bilateral negotiations by the offer of a partial withdrawal or some sort of turnover of
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functional responsibilities such as has been suggested by Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan. He also implied that he would need the backing of some key Arab states before he would risk ignoring the Rabat declarations. The support of Saudi Arabia--Jordan's most important Arab financial benefactor -- would probably be critical. Husayn would also expect strong support from the US and hope that he could gain at least the tacit approval of Syrian President Asad. Despite his reservations about bilateral negotiations and about participating in the Cairo conference, the King is clearly pleased with Sadat's initiatives. In his current round of trips to Arab capitals, he may be looking for ways of involving Jordan eventually in the negotiating process that he hopes will grow out of the Cairo conference. WEST BANK: Palestinians to Cairo Delegations of conservative Palestinian representatives from Gaza and the West Bank are traveling to Cairo this weekend to endorse Egyptian President Sadat's peace initiatives. These delegations are probably too tainted by association with Israel and Jordan to represent any significant body of Palestinian opinion. The delegation from Gaza is headed by an Israeliappointed religious leader. The West Bank contingent includes the son of a traditionalist shaykh of Hebron and a pro-Jordanian notable from Nabulus. None of the pro-PLO mayors of the major cities are included. Most of the elected leaders in the occupied territories have not publicly backed Sadat, but some have privately

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urged the PLO to moderate its criticisms of the Egyptian President. The PLO has asked that the delegations going to Cairo also visit Beirut for discussions with PLO leaders.

Public sympathy for Sadat in the occupied territories is growing. Leaflets and wall posters have appeared in Nabulus and Hebron supporting Sadat.

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